

Editorial

Sehr geehrte Leserin, sehr geehrter Leser,

Am 24. Juni 2018 fanden in der Türkei Parlaments- und Präsidentschaftswahlen statt. Amtsinhaber Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ging bei der Wahl zum Präsidenten – klarer als von vielen erwartet – schon in der ersten Wahlrunde als Sieger hervor. Die regierende AKP verfehlte allerdings bei den Parlamentswahlen die absolute Mehrheit. Ein schwacher Trost für die Opposition, denn mit der Wahl tritt das neue türkische Präsidialsystem in Kraft, in dem Erdoğan sowohl Staats- als auch Regierungschef ist. Am 9. Juli 2018 soll Erdoğan vereidigt werden.

Aus Anlass der (zum Zeitpunkt des Redaktionsschlusses bevorstehenden) Wahlen und dem in der Folge zu erwartenden Anbrechen einer neuen politischen Ära in der Türkei analysieren unsere Türkei-Expert/inn/en die Verhältnisse in der Türkei. Günter Seufert beleuchtet Aspekte des nunmehr in Kraft tretenden „exekutiven Präsidialismus“: Abschaffung des Kabinetts und Konzentration der Macht bei einer Person, begrenzte Rechte und Kompetenzen des Parlaments, unklare Trennung von Exekutive und Legislative sind die wichtigsten Schlagworte. Trotz der evidenten Demokratie-Defizite plädiert Seufert für die Etablierung eines neuen Rahmens in den Beziehungen zwischen der EU und der Türkei: Zu wichtig seien diese Beziehungen für beide Seiten.

Christoph Neumann zeichnet eine Chronologie der Machtergreifung Erdoğans. Erdoğan, so der Autor, sei zum Diktator geworden, nachdem er von einer demokratischen Transformation nichts mehr zu gewinnen hatte und die Möglichkeiten in Händen hielt, seine Macht – vermutlich auf lange Dauer – zu sichern.

Maurus Reinkowski beschreibt Kontinuitäten und Rupturen in der Türkei seit Gründung der Republik. Die nunmehr überwältigende Machtfülle des Staatspräsidenten verändere das politische System und die politische Kultur so umfassend, dass der Autor das Zeitalter einer „zweiten Republik“ gekommen sieht.

Das Pramat der Machtsicherung im Inneren dominiere auch außenpolitische Aktionen wie die türkischen Militäroffensiven in Syrien, so unsere Autorin Gülistan Gürbey. Ideologisch basierten die Interventionen „auf einer Symbiose aus extremem türkischen Nationalismus, Islamismus und Neo-Osmanismus“. Gürbey schließt nicht aus, dass Erdoğan die besetzten Gebiete der Türkei territorial einverleiben wird.

Außerhalb unseres Türkei-Schwerpunkts unterzieht Adis Merdžanović gängige Annahmen im Rahmen der europäischen Integrationspolitik auf dem westlichen Balkan einer kritischen Hinterfragung. Er fordert in der Konsequenz ein Umdenken in der EU, bei dem das Prinzip der Nachhaltigkeit mit Fokus auf die Bürger im Zentrum stehen sollte.

Im März 2003 wurde in Serbien Zoran Djindjić, Serbiens erster post-kommunistischer und pro-europäischer Premierminister, ermordet. Djindjić hatte als politischer Philosoph umfassend über den Charakter und die Grenzen von Staat und Demokratie publiziert – er und seine Arbeiten wurden seither vor allem in Serbien vielfach mythologisiert. Bojan Vranić untersucht die Arbeiten Djindjićs im Licht der sich wandelnden politischen Kontexte in Serbien von den späten 1980er Jahren bis zu seiner Ermordung, und ergründet insofern auch Djindjićs philosophische Argumente hinter seinem Handeln als Politiker.

Eine interessante und erkenntnisreiche Lektüre wünscht

Ihr Redaktionsteam

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Main Focus: Turkey

Günter Seufert

Turkey's Shift to Executive Presidentialism: How to Save EU-Turkish Relations

The most recent report of the European Commission on Turkey from 17 April 2018 points out that, for the time given, there is no room for the opening of new EU negotiation chapters. After 13 years of protracted bargaining, mutual crimination, backtracking of democracy and the rule of law in Turkey as well as a serious loss of prestige and leverage on the side of the EU, relations between Ankara and Brussels are at an all-time low.

Undermining the separation of powers and the independency of the judiciary Turkey's shift to executive presidentialism may well push both sides further apart. However, the EU still matters for Turkey economically and the EU depends on Turkey in the realm of security policy where highly sensitive issues are at stake such as migration, the fight against terrorism and Turkey's membership in NATO. To secure a working relationship, both Turkey and the EU have to shoulder responsibility for the failing accession process. Turkey needs to fix a number of arrangements of its presidential system most detrimental to democracy. For its part, the EU has to create a new framework for relations of its members with Ankara. A framework is needed that is both attractive for Turkey in terms of economy and challenging regarding the rule of law.

Christoph K. Neumann

The Establishment of Dictatorship

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his “New Turkey”

Turkey might have been expected to be on the road towards a liberal democracy with a robust state of law, a vibrant civil society and an economy integrated in the neo-liberal global environment.

The article first describes the multiple integration of Turkey's political system and society in global networks of a liberal order orchestrated by the culturally conservative, economically neo-liberal Party of Justice and Development (AKP) under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The contribution then investigates the un-doing of democratic mechanisms by the very same actors since 2011: Sidelining of military, Erdoğan's ascendency to a position of totally controlling his party, the fight against

the Gülenist movement, and finally the abrupt end of negotiations with the Kurdish opposition.

In conclusion, a bleak picture emerges: The dictatorship being established is going to last. The political constellation of 2011 actually reinforces this development – Erdoğan understood that he had nothing to gain with further steps towards a liberal democracy but realized that due to the absence of strong political institutions supporting a democratic order he was in a position to establish a dictatorial rule.

Maurus Reinkowski

Towards ‘Another Republic’: Continuity and Ruptures in the Republic of Turkey

The Turkish Republic experienced several major disruptions in its history, such as the major military coups in 1960 and 1980, that would have allowed for seeking a more segmented periodization in the way of speaking of a second (or even a third) republic. Yet, the perception of continuity in the history of modern Turkey was so dominant that the concept of *one* Turkish Republic has always prevailed, domestically and outside Turkey.

The article argues that we may characterize present-day Turkey as a *second republic*. On the one hand, many long-term structural characteristics of the Turkish Republic are missing today: The grip of the military on Turkish politics, so dominant since 1960, has vanished; Kemalism, the dominant ideology since the 1920s, has evaporated as has the Kemalist elite that determined Turkey’s trajectory for so many decades. On the other hand, the long period of the AKP’s rule since 2002, particularly the state of emergency imposed after the aborted coup in July 2016 (extended several times since) and the referendum in April 2017 that gave the state presidency overwhelming powers have changed Turkey’s political system and culture in such a fundamental way that we must seek a new understanding and periodization of modern Turkish history. Therefore, the term ‘second republic’ is proposed here.

Gülistan Gürbey

Turkey’s Military Offensive in Syria: Service for Peace or Neo-Ottoman Expansionism?

Although the domestic consolidation of power was a major factor for the Turkish military offensive in North-Syrian Afrin at the beginning of 2018, this invasion is embedded in a wider context. It primarily refers to the ideologically guided neo-Ottoman power politics concerning Syria and the Middle East in contemporary Turkey. The Turkish government’s major objective is to become a hegemonic power in the Middle East. For this purpose Ankara seeks a pan-Islamic/Sunni agenda with the main focus on an anti-Kurd military strategy in order to curtail the Kurds in general and the PKK and PYD in particular.

With a flexible strategy and the tactical alliance with Russia and Iran Ankara managed to enlarge its room for manoeuvre and to conquer Syrian territory. Thus Ankara creates zones of influence, constrains the Kurds and strengthens its position for post-war negotiations in Syria. However, with such manoeuvring Ankara also risks to be constrained by Russia, thus creating polarisation with its Western allies, especially the USA.

Adis Merdžanović

A Sustainable European Integration Policy for the Western Balkans?

Testing Five Common Assumptions

The article offers a critical look at some of the most common assumptions underlying the Western Balkans' European integration process. While generally supportive of the goal of EU membership for the states in the region and the EU's renewed commitment to enlargement in 2018, the contribution highlights important shortcomings in our understanding of EU accession.

Firstly, we should not perceive the Western Balkans as a region in crisis but as one with profound structural problems that necessitate a deeper engagement and not a short-term "crisis management". Likewise, the EU itself is currently undergoing a process of transformation that may put its role as an anchor of stability into question. *Secondly*, involving civil society in the accession process is crucial, but civil society actors throughout the region may have policy objectives that put accession into question. *Thirdly*, while parliaments should play a larger role in the process, the prevailing structures prevent their greater involvement and ultimately undermine the goal of democratisation. *Fourthly*, that EU membership is seen positively should not mean that individual reforms in one state cannot be debated and criticised. *Fifthly* and finally, the EU is not a club whose rules have to be followed, but an inherently flexible structure that new member states may change and improve upon. The article concludes by arguing for a citizen-centred approach so as to make EU accession sustainable among society's members.

Bojan Vranić

Zoran Djindjić: The Myth, a Legacy and Interpretations

After the assassination of Dr. Zoran Djindjić in March 2003 – Serbia's first post-communist and pro-European Prime Minister – his legacy became a political myth. The true and demythologized meaning of his legacy has never been systematically discussed in academic circles in Serbia. This is puzzling since Zoran Djindjić was a political philosopher who wrote extensively on the nature and limits of state and democracy. The absence of an impartial analysis of Djindjić's works and the mythological structure of his political legacy allowed and permit for divergent interpretations of his political vision to spread across the political spectrum, placing him into different ideological frames.

In order to understand the myth's structure the article aims to analyze a part of Zoran Djindjić's work on the nature and limits of the state. The paper argues that the development of Zoran Djindjić's accounts on the state was directly determined by the changing political context in Serbia from the late 1980s right until his assassination in 2003. Therefore, the analysis of his work provides a useful insight into his evolution as a political and opposition leader. By emphasizing the philosophical arguments behind his political behavior, the paper offers an explanation of the interpretation puzzle, i.e. how it is possible to perceive the political vision of Zoran Djindjić in today's Serbia in divergent ways.